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CONTRACT LAW-IMPLIED AGREEMENTS- UNMARRIED COHAB-
ITANTS-The New Jersey Supreme Court has held that unmarried
cohabitation will not bar an otherw~ise valid agreement between par-
ties.
Kozlowski v. Kozlowski, 80 N.J. 378, 403 A.2d 902 (1979).
Irma Kozlowski and Thaddeus Kozlowski began living together out
of wedlock in 1962 and, except for two brief separations, lived together
continuously for fifteen years.1 During this period Irma provided
domestic services2 while Thaddeus financially supported the couple.' In
1968 the Kozlowskis had a serious disagreement which resulted in
separation.' Within a week Thaddeus pleaded for Irma to return to him
and resume her domestic duties in exchange for his promise to take
care of her for her lifetime. Irma acquiesced to this request. In 1977
Thaddeus began to pursue other romantic interests which eventually
led to the dissolution of their living arrangements."
In 1978 Irma instituted an action in the New Jersey Superior Court,
Chancery Division, to recover a share of the assets that Thaddeus had
accumulated during the fifteen years that they had lived together, the
reasonable value of her services, and future support." In returning a
verdict for the plaintiff, the trial court held that one who expressly
contracts to receive compensation for domestic services will not be
denied the right to enforce this contract even though the parties have
engaged in a meretricious relationship.7 The Supreme Court of New
Jersey certified the appeal then pending in the appellate division' and,
1. Kozlowski v. Kozlowski, 80 N.J. 378, 381-82, 403 A.2d 902, 904 (1979). The sur-
names of Irma and Thaddeus are coincidentally the same. Id.
2. The domestic services that Irma provided were housekeeping, shopping, acting as
mother to both parties' children from previous marriages, escorting and accompanying
Thaddeus as he desired, and serving as hostess when necessary for his customers and
business associates. Id. at 382, 403 A.2d at 904.
3. Id. Irma knew little about Thaddeus' business dealings. The title to all of his
assets, including their residence, remained solely in his name. Irma was completely depen-
dant upon Thaddeus for her financial needs. Id. at 381, 403 A.2d at 904.
4. Before the parties separated, Thaddeus had Irma sign a release which stated that
she was to receive $5,000 in full satisfaction of all claims that she might have against him.
Id. at 382, 403 A.2d at 904.
5. Id. at 382, 403 A.2d at 904-05.
6. Kozlowski v. Kozlowski, 164 N.J. Super. 162, 395 A.2d 913 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div.,
1978), affd, 80 N.J. 378, 403 A.2d 902 (1979).
7. Id. at 173, 395 A.2d at 918. A meretricious spouse is "[olne who cohabits with
another knowing that the relationship does not constitute a valid marriage . . . ." Com-
ment, 50 CALIF. L. REV. 866, 873 (1962).
8. Kozlowski v. Kozlowski, 79 N.J. 475, 401 A.2d 230 (1979).
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in an opinion written by Judge Halpern,9 affirmed the trial court's deci-
sion."
Judge Halpern examined the theories of recovery potentially avail-
able to the plaintiff. The arrangement entered into by the Kozlowskis
in 1962 under a promise of marriage was neither a partnership nor a
joint venture." Furthermore, a New Jersey statute 2 precluded agree-
ments based on a promise of marriage.'" The court also noted that
alimony and equitable distribution were not available to the plaintiff
because such awards are only available in divorce or annulment ac-
tions." Therefore, the court determined that the appropriate theory of
recovery was a contract action based on an express agreement be-
tween the parties.'5
Recognizing that parties entering into unmarried cohabitation usu-
ally do not record their understanding in any legal fashion, the court
discussed what evidence should be considered in a determination of
their intent. The terms of their agreement are to be found in the par-
ties' versions of the agreement, and their acts and conduct in light of
the subject matter and the surrounding circumstances."
Citing Marvin v. Marvin,7 the court held that an agreement be-
tween nonmarital partners that is not explicitly and inseparably based
on sexual services is enforceable. The court recognized that because
the mores of society have changed so drastically, unmarried cohabita-
tion should no longer act as a judicial barrier to the fulfillment of the
reasonable expectations of the parties.' The removal of this barrier
was determined not to be contrary to New Jersey public policy. 9 The
court indicated that State v. Saunders" had established that the
cohabitation of unmarried couples was a private matter and, therefore,
no longer a crime under New Jersey law. The Kozlowski court concluded
that, in light of Saunders, cohabitation by nonmarried parties could not
9. Judge Halpern was the presiding judge of the Appellate Division, and was tem-
porarily assigned to the New Jersey Supreme Court. 80 N.J. at 380, 403 A.2d at 904.
10. Id. at 389, 403 A.2d at 908.
11. Id. at 383, 403 A.2d at 905.
12. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:23-1 (West 1952). The statute provides in relevant part,
"The rights of action formerly existing to recover sums of money as damages for ...
breach of contract to marry are abolished from and after June 27, 1935." Id.
13. 80 N.J. at 383, 403 A.2d at 905.
14. Id See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-23 (West Supp. 1980-81).
15. 80 N.J. at 384-85, 403 A.2d at 906.
16. Id. at 384, 403 A.2d at 906.
17. 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976) (unmarried cohabitation
does not invalidate agreement between parties).
18. 80 N.J. at 387, 403 A.2d at 907.
19. Id.
20. 75 N.J. 200, 381 A.2d 333 (1977).
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be termed meretricious. Thus, any lawful agreement made by the par-
ties was deemed by the court to be enforceable."1
Finally, the court determined that, although damages could not be
determined with exactitude, the uncertainty would not preclude
recovery.' Therefore, the plaintiff was entitled to receive a one-time
lump sum judgment that was to be calculated by determining the pres-
ent value of the reasonable future support that was promised to her by
the defendant."
Justice Pashman, although concurring fully in Judge Halpern's ma-
jority opinion, wrote separately to emphasize that quasi-contractual
and equitable remedies should be available to the parties upon the
dissolution of their relationship. 4 Justice Pashman reasoned that
because most parties give no thought to the legal consequences of
their relationship, it would be unreasonable to require that an express
contract be a prerequisite to relief. The intent of the parties must be
construed from their explicit language or from their conduct and ac-
tions interpreted in light of all the surrounding circumstances.' Ac-
cording to Justice Pashman, a court should presume that the parties
intended to deal fairly with one another, and afford equitable relief to
effectuate their intent. Justice Pashman noted that trial courts should
consider the duration of the relationship, the amount of services
rendered by each party, the opportunities sacrificed by each in enter-
ing the living arrangement, and the ability of each to earn a living
after the relationship has been dissolved, in determining remedies.
Finally, the concurring justice stated that these remedies may be
cumulative or exclusive.Y
Traditionally, unmarried sexual cohabitation has been deemed to be
contrary to public policy and a bar to the enforcement of any agree-
ment between the parties. Kozlowski, the first major decision to reject
this concept entirely," is a major step in the evolution of judicial
21. 80 N.J. at 387, 403 A.2d at 907. The court emphasized that the decision was not a
judicial revival of common law marriage which had been previously abolished by the New
Jersey legislature. Id. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:1-10 (West 1968) states that no marriage
celebrated after 1939 is valid unless the parties have obtained a marriage license.
22. 80 N.J. at 388, 403 A.2d at 908. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405
(1975) (compensation shall be equal to the injury); Tessmar v. Grosner, 23 N.J. 193, 203,
128 A.2d 467, 472 (1957) (evidence of damages is sufficient when it affords a basis for
estimating the damages with reasonable certainty).
23. 80 N.J. at 388, 403 A.2d at 908.
24. Id. at 389, 403 A.2d at 909 (Pashman, J., concurring).
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 390-91, 403 A.2d at 909-10 (Pashman, J., concurring).
28. The California Supreme Court in Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106,
134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976), held an agreement between unmarried cohabitants to be valid,
but only if valid consideration is separable from the meretricious relationship. Id. aL 669,
557 P.2d at 113, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 821.
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noninterference.29
Various concepts have limited the rule that a meretricious relation-
ship bars enforcement of agreements between unmarried cohabitants.
For example, common law marriages' afforded cohabitating couples
who had agreed to marry the same rights enjoyed by legally married
couples 1 Legal recognition of putative relationships has also protected
the agreements of some unmarried cohabitants. A putative relationship
exists when at least one of the parties has a good faith belief in the
validity of a void or a voidable marriage.2 The putative spouse has
been accorded rights that are similar to those of a legally married
spouse. Upon termination of the relationship, the accumulated proper-
ty is divided as property would be divided upon dissolution of a valid
marriage." This recovery prevents unjust enrichment of the spouse
who has received the value of the other's sevices which would not have
been performed but for the mistaken belief that they were legally mar-
ried.u
A California court, in In re Marriage of Cary,' expanded the ap-
plicability of the concept by affording a meretricious relationship the
same status as a putative relationship. The Gary court, like the
Kozlowski court, recognized the need for the law to adapt to the in-
crease in long-term nonmarital cohabitation. 6 Because the Cary court's
decision was based on a liberal interpretation of California's communi-
ty property statute,37 the court's reasoning has limited applicability.,,
29. Kozlowski is in line with the trend in family law to remove or circumvent legal
doctrines which lead to inequitable treatment of unmarried cohabitants and their il-
legitimate children without preserving any valid state interest. See Note, 90 HARV. L.
REv. 1708, 1711 (1977). Tennessee, Missouri, Washington, Louisiana, Kentucky, Virginia,
and West Virginia have developed theories which avoid hardships to unmarried
cohabitants and their illegitimate children. Weyrauch, Informal and Formal Mar-
riage-An Appraisal of Trends in Family Organization, 28 U. CHI. L. REV. 88, 104-08
(1960).
30. A common law marriage is "[olne not solemnized in the ordinary way, but
created by an agreement to marry, followed by cohabitation; a consummated agreement
to marry, between persons legally capable of making marriage contract, per verba de
praesenti, followed by cohabitation." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 346 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
31. In a majority of the states common law marriage has been abolished by statute.
H. CLARKE, LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS 45 (1968). See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:1-10
(West 1968) (New Jersey statute abolishing common law marriage).
32. See 53 WASH. L. REv. 145, 147 (1977).
33. Id.
34. See Sanguinetti v. Sanguinetti, 9 Cal. 2d 95, 102, 69 P.2d 845, 848 (1937).
35. 34 Cal. App. 2d 345, 346, 109 Cal. Rptr. 862, 863 (Ct. App. 1973).
36. See Note, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1708, 1712 (1977).
37. See Powell v. Rogers, 496 F.2d 1248, 1251 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1032
(1974); Note, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 1226 (1974).
38. Only Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, and
Washington have community property laws. J. RITCHIE, N. ALFORD & R. EFFLAND, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON DECEDENTS' ESTATES AND TRUSTS 78 (5th ed. 1977).
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A more direct circumvention of the harsh rule applied to agree-
ments between meretricious couples was espoused by the California
Supreme Court in Trutalli v. Meraviglia."9 Trutalli established that liv-
ing together in an unlawful meretricious relationship did not preclude
a lawful agreement if the immoral relationship was not contemplated
to be the consideration for the agreement." Although this rule provided
relief for some, it allowed the frustration of many agreements because
the court retained discretion to determine whether the agreement was
made in contemplation of sexual services." Seeking to solidify this
nebulous" rule, the California Supreme Court in Marvin held that
agreements that are not exclusively based on sexual services are valid.
The rule established in Marvin allows the parties relief even though
the meretricious relationship forms part of the consideration, provided
it does not represent the exclusive consideration upon which the agree-
ment was made."
The Kozlowski court stated that it accepted the rule established in
Marvin. Although the express agreements were upheld in both cases,
the means to the end were different. The Marvin court held that
although unmarried cohabitation is meretricious, the sexual service
aspect of the relationship may be separated from valid consideration to
enable an otherwise valid agreement to take effect." The Kozlowski
court refused to consider unmarried cohabitation to be meretricious.
Finding that public attitudes as well as court decisions no longer hold
unmarried cohabitation to be against public policy, the Kozlowski court
believed the more honest approach to be the abolition of any rule that
would defeat the fulfillment of the reasonable expectations of the par-
ties."
Although the agreements in Marvin and Kozlowski were considered
to be express, both courts found it necessary to encompass implied-in-
fact agreements in their decisions. Because parties entering into un-
married cohabitation usually do not record their understanding in any
39. 215 Cal. 698, 12 P.2d 430 (1932).
40. 215 Cal. at 698-99, 12 P.2d at 430-31. See Lytle v. Newall, 24 Ky. 188, 68 S.W. 118
(1902) (contract is valid unless made in contemplation of an illicit relationship); In re Gor-
don's Estate, 8 N.Y.2d 71, 75, 168 N.E.2d 139, 140, 202 N.Y.S.2d 1, 3 (1960) (express
agreements are enforceable as long as sexual relations were not part of the consideration).
41. Note, 90 HARv. L. REV. 1708, 1713 (1977).
42. The court in Marvin stated that "the past decisions hover over the issue in the
somewhat wispy form of the figures of a Chagall painting." 18 Cal. 3d at 669, 557 P.2d at 113,
134 Cal. Rptr. at 822.
43. Id. Contracts which include distinct and separable obligations, some of which are
legal and some prohibited, are nevertheless enforceable. Id. See Mannion v. Greenbrook
Hotel, Inc., 138 N.J. Eq. 518, 520, 48 A.2d 888, 889 (Ct. Err. & App. 1946).
44. 18 Cal. 3d at 669, 557 P.2d at 113, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 821.
45. 80 N.J. at 387, 403 A.2d at 907.
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legal fashion," expansion of relief to implied agreements was necessary
to give the decisions wider effect. Remedies for both implied-in-fact
and express agreements are based upon the intention of the parties; 7
they differ only in the degree of proof required." Although the Marvin
court did not specify the factors to be considered in ascertaining the
intent of the parties, the Kozlowski court did. The terms of the parties'
agreement are to be found in their respective versions of the agree-
ment, and their acts and conduct in light of the subject matter and the
surrounding circumstances." These guidelines direct the courts' in-
quiry to the objective manifestations of the parties, while allowing
flexibility for case-by-case application.
Although Kozlowski opens the door for recovery based on an ex-
press or implied-in-fact agreement between unmarried cohabitants, the
question of whether implied-in-law remedies will be available to such
parties remains. Implied-in-law remedies go a step beyond implied-in-
fact remedies in attempting to prevent unjust enrichment by not re-
quiring manifestations of assent.5 The Kozlowski court did not specify
whether implied-in-law as well as implied-in-fact contracts are included
in its general reference to implied contracts. However, the cases that
the court cited to support its concept of implied contracts show that an
implied contract is to be considered in the narrower context of implied-
in-fact contracts.5 ' Although tle majority in Marvin stated that a party
to a meretricious relationship may recover based on equitable prin-
ciples, the concurring and dissenting opinion criticized the majority for
affording little guidance in shaping these equitable remedies.2 Marvin
46. Id.
47. See Note, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1708, 1715 (1977).
48. 80 N.J. at 384, 403 A.2d at 906. See 1 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 18, at 41
(1963).
49. 80 N.J. at 384, 403 A.2d at 906. See Martin v. Campanaro, 156 F.2d 127, 129 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 759 (1946); St. Paul Fire Co. v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of N.
America, 32 N.J. 17, 23, 158 A.2d 825 (1960); West Caldwell v. Caldwell, 26 N.J. 9, 28-29,
138 A.2d 402, 412 (1958); 1 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 3, at 8-12 (3d ed. 1957); 1 A. CORBIN,
CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 18, at 39-43 (1963).
50. A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 19, at 27 (1952).
51. See Martin v. Campanaro, 156 F.2d 127,129 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 759 (1946);
St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co. v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of N. America, 32 N.J. 17,23,158 A.2d
825, 828 (1960); West Caldwell v. Caldwell, 26 N.J. 9, 28-29, 138 A.2d 402, 412 (1958). The con-
curring opinion in Kozlowski however, specifically includes implied-in-law agreements. 80
N.J. at 389-91, 403 A.2d at 909 (Pashman, J., concurring). The majority in Marvin specifically
included the recognition of implied-in-fact and implied-in-law agreements in its decision. 18
Cal. 3d at 684, 557 P.2d at 122-23, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 831.
52. 18 Cal. 3d at 685, 557 P.2d at 123, 18 Cal. Rptr. at 685 (Clark, J., concurring and
dissenting). See Morone v. Morone, 6 FAM. L. RaP. (BNA) 3043 (1980) (rejects application
of equitable remedies citing concurring and dissenting opinion in Marvin).
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fails to establish what circumstances would permit recovery, as well as
what limitations would be imposed upon recovery, or whether the dif-
ferent remedies available for express, implied-in-fact, and implied-in-
law agreements would be cumulative or exclusive.
The concurring opinion in Kozlowski directly responds to this prob-
lem by setting out specific factors that courts might look to in deter-
mining application of equitable remedies." These factors include the
duration of the relationship, the amount and types of services rendered
by each of the parties, the opportunities foregone in entering the liv-
ing arrangement, and the ability of each to earn a living after the rela-
tionship has been dissolved.5 The concurring justice also recognized
that the remedies may be cumulative or exclusive.58
As societal attitudes change, so must the laws that govern society
change. This is especially true when the individual's reasonable expec-
tations are frustrated because of a law that no longer reflects the
prevailing morality. Laws do not change abruptly to meet a change in
attitudes, but evolve with exceptions and circumventions of basic prin-
ciples. The Kozlowski court has adopted a position of neutrality in non-
marital relationships. The evolution, however, may not be complete.
The courts began by denying recovery based on express agreements
between unmarried cohabitants; Kozlowski departed from this harsh
approach and proclaimed a policy of noninterference. The question re-
mains whether the courts will complete the evolution by affording un-
married parties protection through implied-in-law remedies.
William D. Clifford
53. 18 Cal. 3d at 685, 557 P.2d at 123, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 685.
54. 80 N.J. at 390, 403 A.2d at 909 (Pashman, J., concurring). Justice Pashman ap-
pears to be responding to Justice Clark's concurrence and dissent in Marvin.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 909-10 (Pashman, J., concurring).
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